2009 – 2015  美国康奈尔大学哲学博士 （Cornell University）

             2008 – 2009 美国Hope College哲学系访问学生

             2005 – 2009 武汉大学哲学学士（比较哲学国际班）

认识论

Publications

Book

(2023) Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. 

Papers

(forthcoming) The Value of Evidence in Decision-Making. The Journal of

Philosophy. 

(forthcoming) It Can Be Rational to Change Priors. Analysis. 

(forthcoming) The Dogmatism Puzzle. The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition.

(2024) Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism. Erkenntnis. 

(2023) Permissivism, The Value of Rationality, and a Convergence-Theoretic

Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106, 157-175. 

(2023) (Review) The Rational Mind, by Scott Sturgeon. Mind, 132(527), 871-880

(2023）认知宽容论综述.《哲学评鉴》（第二辑), 119-133.

(2021) "The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism." Episteme 18(4), 654-

673.

(2020) "Higher-Order Defeat and Intellectual Responsibility." Synthese 197 (12):

5435-5455. 

(2020) "A New Causal-Doxastic Theory of Basing." In  Pat Bondy and Adam Cart-er (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing

Relation. Routledge.

(2016) “Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.” Australasian Journal  of Philosophy 94 (3): 563-575. 

(2015) "Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality." Australasian Journal of

Philosophy 93 (1): 93-108. 

Professional Service

Referee:

Nous, Journal of Philosophy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical

Studies, Philosophers Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Synthese,

Ergo, Erkenntnis, American Philosophical Quaterly, Episteme

Editor:

Guest editor for the topical collection “Current Themes in Epistemology:

Asian Epistemology Network” in Asian Journal of Philosophy.